The Other Industrial Art: Deleuze, Cinema, Affect and Sport

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Abstract

The emergence of cinema in the nineteenth century was contemporaneous with the rise of modern sports, both popular spectacles connected with the industrial revolution. Deleuze sees film in his *Cinema* books as the aesthetic expression of a specifically modern understanding of movement, in contrast to the science and philosophy of antiquity. This article uses Deleuze's analysis of cinema to characterise the aesthetic of modern sports as another 'industrial art' with a similarly innovative approach to space, time and movement. It also shows how the aesthetic impact of a sporting match is aligned with the dimensions of Deleuze's 'affection-image' in cinema, which frames the world as a 'face' divided between absorption and agitation.

Keywords: Deleuze, cinema, sport, affect, affection-image, movement-image

In his benchmark work *Beyond a Boundary*, C. L. R. James argues that the place of sport in modern society is analogous to the place of theatre in ancient Greece (James [1963] 2000: 157–8). Antiquity and the nineteenth century were both periods in the history of the West marked by the significant investment of resources in organised sports and the rise of democratic social movements. However, while sports were a fairly elite practice in ancient Greece and theatre was the more popular form of cultural expression, in modern times the situation is reversed: sport has become the cultural spectacle of the people and theatre the cultural spectacle of the elite. It is a neat thesis, possibly too

neat, but a suggestive one, and a way of introducing the question of the aesthetics of sport in relation to cinema, the other popular spectacle that arose out of the industrial revolution and the only rival to sport in terms of global cultural dominance. In *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, Deleuze develops an argument about cinema *qua* 'industrial art' and the modernity it expresses in its conception of movement as compared with the science and philosophies of antiquity. Drawing on Bergson's understanding of this contrast and his theory of the image, Deleuze develops a 'taxonomy' of images and signs for the cinema with a view to answering the question: 'what exactly does cinema show us about space and time that the other arts don't show?' (Deleuze 1990: 83/58[1]). Whether or not sport is technically an art form, it nevertheless has its own aesthetic based on the way it 'thinks' space, time and movement. This aesthetic overlaps at points with the aesthetics of cinema, as Deleuze understands it, in particular its connection with movement as composed of 'any-moment-whatevers' and the dynamic of the 'affection-image'. These two points of overlap form the two parts of this article. In the first place, what happens if we consider sport as an aesthetic expression of a modern, mechanistic conception of movement, along the same lines as Deleuze's analysis of cinema? In the second place, can we analyse the effect of sport and its specific configuration of space, time and movement in terms of the language of affect in cinema?

'Sport' is understood here as an event or spectacle rather than a practice engaged in by athletes. As a spectacle, sport consists of not just the players, but the viewers, the time and place, the weather (in the case of outdoor sports) and, in modern times, the television coverage. The distinction between sport as practice and sport as event is not one between the thing in itself and its representation, or the active perspective of the practitioner and the passive or reactive perspective of the spectator. A sporting event is a composite phenomenon where action, reaction and circumstance are intermingled and roles are shared and rotated among all the participants. Sporting spectators are not passive and are often even part of the show. On the other side, players experience and react to events at the same time as the viewing public. Bergson's concept of the 'image', a key source in the cinema books, was designed to overcome the opposition between representation and thing (Bergson [1896] 1991: 161/xi). It is an autonomous vehicle for receiving and transmitting movement, a spatio-temporal dynamic independent of a perceiving subject. Similarly, the affection-image understands affect as a particular rhythm and arrangement of movements, rather than being referred to a feeling subject. There is no discontinuity between sport

Figure 1. Eadweard Muybridge, *The Horse in Motion* (1878). (Source: Public domain via Wikimedia Commons.)

'itself' and its perception or affect within the overall dynamic of the sporting event.

I. Cinema and Sport 1: The Industrial Art

Deleuze uses two main sources from Bergson's work to frame his approach to cinema in *Cinema 1*: the theses on movement from *Creative Evolution* (chapter 1, the 'first commentary on Bergson') and the theory of the image from *Matter and Memory* (chapter 4, the 'second commentary on Bergson'). The first commentary addresses Bergson's claim that our understanding of movement, where we break movement down into immobile elements and then attempt to reconstruct it artificially from those elements, amounts to performing a sort of 'internal cinematography'. Here is the key passage from *Creative Evolution*, also cited by Deleuze:

> Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this

becoming itself. Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general. Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematograph inside us. We may therefore sum up what we have been saying in the conclusion that *the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind*. (Bergson [1907] 1991: 753/306; most of the passage is reproduced in Deleuze 1983: 10/2)

It is unusual, Deleuze notes (1983: 10/2), that Bergson chooses an extremely recent technology (*L'Évolution créatrice* was published in 1907) to explain what is supposed to be an age-old illusion, though this may have been a way of emphasising the very artificiality of the process, given the relatively rudimentary state of film technology at the time. Nevertheless, Bergson goes on to stress the difference between the 'ancient' form of this illusion and the approach to movement that launched modern science and technology, the 'second thesis' Deleuze presents.

Ancient science and philosophy, Bergson claims, take a formal, holistic approach to movement based on an idea of the essential nature of the object and its place in the 'cosmos'. Platonic Forms identify the intelligible being beneath the sensible becoming, the ideal quality or moment the sensible thing only ever approximates. Aristotle considers movement in terms of global qualities such as whether it is 'natural' or 'forced', its general orientation (up, down, straight, curved) and whether the object is moving away or towards its 'proper' place (Bergson [1907] 1991: 775/331). The movement is only interesting in terms of the culminating 'moment' or moments that synthesise its meaning or regulate its course. For Galileo, on the other hand, there is no 'essential' moment of the trajectory of a falling body, no particular instant that is intrinsically more interesting; it can be considered at any moment whatever of its movement to yield information. Modern science is based on a material, quantitative analysis of movement, where the nature and quantity of the divisions and subdivisions are arbitrary or voluntary rather than based on an idea of the 'natural articulations' of the universe. Bergson returns to the 'cinematographic mechanism' at this point in his exposition, but this time in order to highlight its difference from the vision of antiquity. The ancient approach, he says, is like the vision of the naked eye that, seeing a galloping horse for example, can only appreciate it globally or grasp a particular moment that seems to sum up the whole action, and '[i]t is this attitude that sculpture has fixed on the frieze of the Parthenon':

[b]ut instantaneous photography isolates any moment whatever; it ranks them all on the same level, and in this way the gallop of a horse can be

split into as many successive attitudes as one likes, instead of being gathered up into a single attitude, which would shine out at a privileged instant and illuminate a whole period. (Bergson [1907] 1991: 776/332; translation modified)

Deleuze analyses this difference as a contrast between the division of movement into 'formal transcendent elements' or 'poses', based on the concept of the privileged instant, and a division into 'immanent material elements' or 'sections', based on the concept of the any-instant-whatever (Deleuze 1983: 13/4). Although every instant is an 'any-instant-whatever' on the modern model, which is to say equidistant from and 'on the same level' as any other, this does not mean they are all the same. Deleuze (15/5) refers to Muybridge's famous footage of the galloping horse (Figure 1): in this series of shots, some moments are more 'remarkable' than others, for example the crucial moment when all four of the horse's hooves are off the ground. But this remarkable moment is not the same as a formal 'pose'. It is literally and conceptually dependent on the series it occurs in, a 'qualitative leap' based on a quantitative process of accumulation. Even if we isolate such a moment, it is still a 'section' of a series and acquires its meaning, as remarkable, *from* its relationship to all the other ordinary moments, rather than being a pose that synthesises a whole process it gives meaning *to*.

The key question for Deleuze is the significance of this difference, what it amounts to in the end. In one sense, there is no difference, because both models reduce movement to immobile elements, for the pragmatic reasons that drive science, in Bergson's view. On the other hand, Deleuze sees the modern approach as signalling a radical shift in philosophical terms. If ancient science and ancient philosophy shared a focus on eternal forms, modern science's analysis of movement in terms of 'any-moment-whatevers' implies 'a complete conversion of philosophy', because 'one must be capable of thinking the production of the new, which is to say the remarkable and the singular, at any one of these moments' (Deleuze 1983: 17/7). Bergson's philosophy, which focuses on the equivalence between time and novelty, would be the 'metaphysics' that complements modern physics. Deleuze's suggestion ties in with Bergson's own analysis. In the end, Bergson argues, the defining difference between ancient and modern science is the role the latter gives to time, or the fact that it gives time a role at all in its calculations. Unlike ancient science and philosophy, for which time was inessential or a mark of imperfection, modern science treats time as an independent variable (Bergson [1907] 1991: 779/336) on its analytical

grid, an 'input' factor that makes a difference. If time makes a difference, however, then time must be creative, Bergson argues; it adds something new. Seen from the outside as a set of points on a grid, time is just another number to manipulate. A later moment is no different to an earlier one, or the difference it makes is relative to the interest of the scientist. From the inside, however, in concrete duration, with no control over the passage of time and with no symmetry between future and past, the difference time makes is real and absolute. Why, Bergson asks, would the universe succeed in time at all instead of being given all at once, 'as on the film of the cinematograph' (Bergson [1907] 1991: 782/339) unless it was unfinished business? Bergson's thesis that duration equals creativity – '*the duration of the universe must therefore be one with the latitude of creation which can find a place there*' (Bergson [1907] 1991: 782/340) – is his philosophical translation of the independence of time as a variable.

There should also, Deleuze suggests, be a specifically aesthetic development of this conception of movement as the production of the new at any-moment-whatever, and the evidence of this in the arts is clear. Across the visual and performing arts at the turn of the century, formal poses gave way to a more casual, fragmented conception of movement, embedded in the course of everyday life or moved away from figurative representation altogether. Deleuze sees cinema as being in a privileged position to express the new aesthetic, especially once it shed theatrical conventions such as the fixed viewpoint. Instead of being the 'perfected apparatus of the oldest illusion', it could on the contrary be 'the organ for perfecting the new reality' (Deleuze 1983: 17/8). Contemporary with the emergence of cinema in the second half of the nineteenth century was the dramatic rise and consolidation of formally organised sports and sporting events. Like cinema, modern sports can be understood as an aesthetic expression of the 'new reality', and in certain respects the expression is more direct and more complete. There are also connections to be brought out between the sports of ancient Greece and the ancient conception of movement, explored below.

Deleuze makes his own contrast between 'old' and 'new' sports and forms of movement in one of the interviews in *Negotiations*, after he denounces modern thought for returning to the problem of origins and 'blocking' analyses in terms of vectors and movement (Deleuze 1990: 165/121). Traditional sports, he says – he mentions running and shotput – represent an old-fashioned concept of movement that is essentially based on a leverage mechanism: the athlete is the point

around which the principles of effort, resistance, motion and fulcrum are organised. In contrast, 'modern' sports such as surfing and hang-gliding involve inserting oneself 'into an existing wave' rather than being a point of origin. They are no longer about the beginning or the end of the movement, but negotiating the 'in between'. There are elements here of Deleuze's contrast between the ancient and modern conceptions of movement in *Cinema 1* – the ancient conception that refers movement to 'narrative' moments such as origin and telos, versus the modern movement that can be interrupted at any moment whatever. Deleuze's comments are focused on the actual mechanics and dynamics of the athlete's actions in different sports, even though he is suggesting they also express a cultural and aesthetic shift. Once we consider sports directly, in terms of their aesthetics as events, we can take in their virtual dynamics rather than being limited to actual physical relationships. From this perspective, one way of viewing the contrast Deleuze makes between old and new sports would be in terms of a more conceptual difference between sport as 'feat' and sport as 'game'. In the latter case, the activity of the athlete would always already be part of an existing structure and movement and the focus is precisely on how and where to insert his or her action into the play.

Deleuze and Bergson present the ancient understanding of movement as its synthesis into formal poses and privileged moments. Traditional events in the ancient games – wrestling, boxing, long jump, javelin, discus, equestrian – are like a homage to the art of correct poses and stances and the relationships and transitions between them. Composite events such as the pentathlon perform an even higher synthesis, making each event an ideal point in a circuit through which the athlete must pass. Ancient Greek sports are typically individual events that invite the athlete to aspire to a formal ideal, with the possibility, if victorious, of being literally eternalised in a commemorative statue. If we so easily imagine ancient Greek sports in these ideal terms, it is no doubt because so much of ancient Greek art is dedicated to immortalising athletic postures. The classical Greek statue is a literal synthesis of movement as a formal ideal. Even when the subjects of Greek sculpture are gods or warriors rather than athletes – Poseidon wielding the trident, the Riace warriors – they have the controlled pose of a dancer. In contrast, modern sports are 'points games' that enmesh movement in a structure that expresses its mechanical material analysis. The play is governed by a spatio-temporal grid or a set rhythm of repeated actions, where each point – minute, metre, line, ball – represents both a unit of quantitative

analysis and a potential qualitative threshold. The scoreline of a game is just a sum of remarkable points – goal, wicket, run, try – the ones deemed to 'count' most towards the result of the game.

Each sport distributes these points and thresholds in different ways. The fields of full contact sports, where much of the contest concerns the loss or gain of ground (e.g. rugby league and Australian and American football), are divided every ten metres or yards out from a centre line. For limited contact sports such as basketball, netball and soccer, the playing area is divided up in a more qualitative way, designating thresholds such as the penalty box, goal circle, free throw lines. These qualitative thresholds still take their meaning, however, from their relative distance from a scoring end, just as every loss or gain of a yard in full contact sports represents a qualitative change in the status of the game. For sports with a fixed playing period, the minute is the ultimate equidistant point that can be ordinary or remarkable, regular or singular. In these sports, no game call is complete without a regular reminder of how many minutes have been played or are left. A soccer score will give both the overall scoreline (1–2, for example) and the 'time signature' of each goal: the name of the goal scorer and the minute the goal was scored (Ibini 14', Smeltz 32', Boxall 46'). Like a musical time signature, these notations indicate a particular rhythm of the game relative to its underlying beat. An early goal is not the same as a late goal; a different set of numbers tells a different qualitative story. A scorecard in any sport is like a sheet of music that can be read by someone who has not seen the game, and give them an idea of its particular rhythm and melody. Games where the time of the game is more elastic – cricket, baseball, tennis – have more of an internal punctuation system, where the unit of measure is an action or set of actions (balls, overs, deliveries, serves, sets, strikes, wickets, innings). Each ball in a cricketing over is an ordinary point, theoretically equal to all the others, but capable of being remarkable in a number of ways, an 'unending series of events, each single one fraught with immense possibilities of expectation and realization' (James [1963] 2000: 197). In certain situations in cricket – in limited-over games or when playing for a draw – the ball plays a role similar to the minute or second hand in other sports, counted down as the end approaches, each one ticking off a moment of survival or potential strike.

There are several modern sports that highlight formal postures and transitions in a way that suggests the 'pose' in ancient sport – the concepts of 'stance' and 'action' in tennis and cricket, for example. In the *Abécédaire* interviews (1996), Deleuze describes the interest of sport in terms of the 'corporeal attitudes' and variations it displays.

Deleuze was a tennis fan from childhood (the title of the episode is 'T as in Tennis') and he presents the difference between Björn Borg and John McEnroe in terms of their signature stances and methods of play. Borg was a 'Christ-like' figure who took sport to the masses with his transparent, accessible style of play: balls served high with topspin from the very back of the court. Just as in the arts, Deleuze says, Borg was a great stylist, a 'genius' who invented a form that then became copied by others. In contrast, McEnroe was an 'aristocrat' – 'Egyptian serve, Russian soul' – who invented shots he knew no one could understand that were all about placement. It is not clear, though, that the ancient 'poses' and modern 'stances' are the same thing. There is an ideal set of postures and movements in cricket and tennis: the correct or 'orthodox' forms of certain actions. But this is not what Deleuze is identifying as style, which is like the 'signature' of a player in the same way as Deleuze and Guattari refer to concepts as being 'signed' by their creators in *What Is Philosophy?* (Deleuze and Guattari 1991: 28/23). This signature is not an individual variation or interpretation of an ideal, but rather a reconstruction of an action that adds something to an existing form or announces a new one.

James also discusses the concept of sporting 'style' in *Beyond a Boundary*. On the one hand, he uses art critic Bernard Berenson's idea of 'significant form', which is clearly inspired by classical and Renaissance values. The aim is to represent a body or movement in such a way that it 'extracts the significance' of the body or movement for the viewer, recreating its actuality as a synthetic ideal and 'rendering the one particular movement that we shall be able to realize all other movements that the same figure may make' (Berenson, cited in James [1963] 2000: 201–2). On the other hand, James compares the appeal of individual sportspeople to the appeal of actors on film:

> There are movie stars, world famous and rightly so, who mumble words and go through motions which neither they nor their audience care very much about. Their appeal is themselves, how they walk, how they move, how they do anything or nothing as long as they are themselves and their particular quality shines through. (James [1963] 2000: 199)

This is very much the modern aesthetic of the film camera, which is able to register and use the minutiae of unconscious mannerisms, in contrast to the controlled gestures and projection of the classical theatre actor or indeed a sculpted figure. In sport, repetition of action does the work of the mechanical registration of the camera, or works alongside it. For

James, it is paradoxically the very repetition of the gestures over long periods of time that takes the routine elements of the action away:

> The long hours [in cricket], the measured ritualism, and the varied and intensive physical activity which take place within it, these strip the players of conventional aspects, and human personality is on view long enough and in sufficiently varied form to register itself indelibly. (James [1963] 2000: 199)

This was the kind of drill a film-maker like Robert Bresson put his 'models' through with the same end in view: to force a certain 'nature' to betray itself that would be unique to the individual but alien to the psychological or intentional concept of the person or actor.

As Bresson says, 'A system doesn't regulate everything. It is a bait for something' (Bresson 1975: 18/5). A sports match is a rigidly codified and repetitive spectacle in all the ways outlined above, and yet its only, crucial aim is to yield an event that no one has ever seen before and that everyone creates from minute to minute. This is the whole intoxication of sport: you cannot look away and you cannot watch it later because something remarkable can happen at any time and it can only happen once – now. Different sports have different rhythms, different dilations and contractions, but this remains the global principle. Deleuze's analysis of the modern conception of movement shows that there is no opposition or contradiction between a mechanical regularity and the production of novelty: it is the constant of the grid that highlights irregularities, every implacable 'beat' is a potential tipping point.

II. Cinema and Sport 2: The Affection-Image

Deleuze's first commentary on Bergson starts with the 'cinematography' that Bergson suggests happens in our heads. The second commentary starts with the 'photography' that Bergson suggests is 'already taken, already developed in the very heart of things and at all the points of space' (Bergson [1896] 1991: 188/31). This is the 'movement-image' at the centre of Bergson's metaphysical vision in *Matter and Memory*, which forms the building block of Deleuze's typology of images in cinema. The movement-image is analysed into three principal 'varieties' that reflect different aspects of Bergson's 'sensory-motor schema': perception, affection and action. Bergson places affect or affection in the gap between perception and action, between movement received and movement transmitted. In the first place, this gap is just subjectivity itself, the hesitation or interval that differentiates automatic from conscious action (Bergson [1896] 1991: 169/1). Instead

Figure 2. Day 1 of Boxing Day Test between Australia and India, 26 December 2012, Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG). (Source: Photo © Richard Tulloch, richardtullochwriter.com, reproduced with the kind permission of the photographer.)

of immediately relaying a movement or action, the body absorbs it, and this resonance is 'feeling' – affect and interiority. Stronger affect comes from an intensification of this gap or a confusion between perception and action. The body is differentiated into sensory and motor functions, but this does not prevent the sensory organs from attempting to 'act' on incoming stimulus, applying 'a kind of motor tendency on a sensory nerve' (Bergson [1896] 1991: 204/56, cited in Deleuze 1983: 96/66, 126/87). This attempt is ineffectual in terms of being translated into full action, because the senses are essentially immobile, but generates partial, impulsive movements – expressions, tics, spasms – that come on top of the general absorption of the movement as sensation or feeling. Deleuze makes the connection to the face as the exemplar of this mechanism (which is a kind of breakdown of a mechanism), where the most limited motor capacities meet the highest concentration of sensory organs, where perception and action can only be diverted into reflection and expression:

It is this combination of a reflecting, immobile unity and of intense expressive movements which constitutes the affect. But is this not the same thing as a Face in person? The face is this organ-carrying plate of nerves which has sacrificed most of its global mobility and which gathers or expresses out in

the open all kinds of tiny local movements which usually stay buried in the body. (Deleuze 1983: 126/87–8; translation modified)

If a shot of a face in close-up has become a sort of visual shorthand in cinema for conveying emotion or introspection, this is because the elements of the face – smooth reflective surface, intense micro-movements – express this more general affective schema. This schema can then in turn be found in other objects and other images, which are thus 'faceified' (and 'close-upped'):

> Each time we discover these two poles in something – reflecting surface and intensive micro-movements – we can say that this thing has been treated as a face [*visage*]: it has been 'envisaged' or rather 'faceified' [*visagéifiée*], and in turn it stares at us [*dévisage*], it looks at us … even if it does not resemble a face. (Deleuze 1983: 126/88)

The analysis thus culminates with a restatement of the equivalence between face, close-up and affection-image that opens the chapter on the affection-image (*the affection-image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face*), even when the image is not literally of a face and not technically a close-up:

> As for the face itself, we will not say that the close-up deals with [*traite*] it or subjects it to some kind of treatment: there is no close-up *of* the face, the face is in itself close-up, the close-up is by itself face and both are affect, affection-image. (Deleuze 1983: 126/88)[2]

The beauty of this analysis of affect in sensory-motor terms is that it explains the privileged connection between the face and affect in a way that does not rely on an abstract psychological connection – the face as the 'expression' or 'projection' of a mental idea – and allows us to see affect or faces in inanimate objects without anthropomorphising or psychologising them. Deleuze in fact considers the face and the close-up to be depersonalising, anti-social elements in film – 'a nudity of the face much greater than that of the body, an inhumanity much greater than that of animals' (Deleuze 1983: 141/99). Returning to Bresson's mechanistic aesthetic, ideas and emotions are understood in formal terms as a particular arrangement and rhythm of movements, lines and surfaces, something that goes from the outside in rather than the inside out. It is another way that the 'smoothness' of cinematography replaces the 'relief' of theatre (Bresson 1975: 24/9).

The elements of the face – smooth, immobile surface and busy micro-movements – form the two 'poles' of the affection-image and allow us to characterise an image as more 'reflective' or more 'intensive' based

on the visual or conceptual emphasis on one element or the other. The 'reflective' aspect of affect is foregrounded when the stress is on the 'outline' that unifies the features – pale surface, broad expanse, smooth brow – or on a single quality that unifies disparate elements. The 'intensive' aspect is foregrounded when the stress is on a series or succession of movements that break up the surface and point towards a transition from one state to another – the 'features' that animate and transform the face (Deleuze 1983: 128–9/89–90). Deleuze connects the two poles to two different conceptions of 'the passions' in philosophy: wonder and desire (127/88). The reflective pole corresponds to wonder or admiration, which is fixed on an object, immobile and thoughtful, and represents a capacity for reflection and absorption. The intensive pole corresponds to desire, which is restless and characterised by impulsive, furtive movements that link up and tend towards a threshold or climax.

The connection between the affection-image and sport might seem illogical: sport seems to be all about the perfect functioning of the sensory-motor mechanism rather than its complication, all about seamless transitions between perceptions and actions rather than their interruption. Even as a spectacle, are we not celebrating sheer athleticism, the marriage of form and function? It is true that athleticism, the perfection of physical action, is an aspect of all sport, and perhaps this is another case of distinguishing the 'Olympic' side of sport from its more specifically modern expression. In any team sport, however, it is the job of one side to thwart and frustrate the action of the other: cases of pure, unimpeded and fully realised action (a running try in rugby, for example, or a perfect Shane Warne leg-break) are remarkable rather than ordinary events. The default state of both player and spectator in many sports is more likely to be incomplete actions and frustrated efforts, with occasional releases of tension. In addition, if we step back from the individual athlete or team and take in the whole scene, we see a smooth surface – the playing field, pitch or court – traversed by an intensive series of movements. Rather than, or as well as, an action-image, sport gives us an affection-image with its poles of wonder and desire, quality and potential, the arena being a virtual space which extracts the pure affect and event from the actual causal interactions between bodies.

The sporting field offers the clearest analogue of the face, the playing area defining a blank canvas for the 'traits' that will give it character: 'Affect is made of these two elements: the firm qualification of a white space, but also the intense potentialisation of what is going to happen there' (Deleuze 1983: 134/94). This 'faciality' is duplicated or reinforced by the surrounding crowd, another absorbing and reflecting

unity that is traversed by micro-movements, impulses, paroxysms. The balance of 'outline' to 'feature' on this face varies across different sports and grounds and gives them a different affective tonality. A 20,000 m^2 cricket ground like the Melbourne Cricket Ground (Figure 2) swamps its thirteen players, while ten basketball players can dominate a 420 m^2 court. This places cricket at the reflective pole and basketball at the intensive end of the affection-image, which probably fits the immediate impression each game gives, but this distinction is also about a different distribution of reflectiveness and intensity, rather than just the dominance of one and the weakness of the other. The actual action in cricket lacks nothing in intensity – the delivery, play and return of the ball can all involve extreme speeds and split-second reflexes – but it is highly compressed, just as most of the players on the field occupy a small area, with a great deal of 'space' around each event, a concertina of contraction and dilation. If cricket and baseball have the reputation of being 'intellectual' sports, this surely has a lot to do with the sheer volume of space and time for 'reflection' between each event, like a single note or drop in a pond that can reverberate at length before the next one comes along. While we can see the trajectory of the action on a basketball court or of a single ball in cricket, the pattern formed by a series of cricket deliveries can only be formed in the mind or reconstructed after the fact. This reflection has its own intensity: pauses, downtime, 'mind games' and the sheer weight of duration can all accumulate and tend towards a climax. Creating tension by preventing scoring – 'tying down', 'drying up' or 'strangling' – is a standard method for getting a batsman out. A similar paradox to timewasting, it is a way of making something happen by making nothing happen, of progressing the game by arresting the game. In a completely different way, a big 'six' in cricket (when the ball is hit in the air over the boundary rope, automatically adding six runs to the scoreboard), like a home run in baseball, is another kind of synthesis of intensity and reflection, like a shooting star. It is a great leap forward and expression of power, but its trajectory is also a contour that embraces the ground, sky, horizon, and unites the crowd in wonder, whichever side they are on.

Sports where the connections between the actions are more immediate – the football codes, basketball, hockey, netball – still have their own rhythm of 'up' and 'down' time that integrates reflection into the intensive series. The importance of the clock in these kinds of sports has already been mentioned above and the domination of time, I would argue, is the ultimate 'fixed or terrible' thought (Deleuze 1983: 128/90) that forms the overriding reflective pole in these games. Deleuze uses

the example of the image of a clock face – a 'face' that is not a face – to introduce his theory of the affection-image (125/87). In a film, we may see a shot of a clock face in close-up, once or maybe several times. We see the twitching hands of the clock and the passive surface of the dial. We see the combination of action and immobility, an 'intensive series' that approaches a climax and a 'reflective unity' that absorbs the movement, the signature of affect. We understand that something will happen and there is nothing we can do about it. In a modern sport, the 'clock' is most likely to be a digital display, but it does not need an analogue 'face' to communicate the affective charge Deleuze describes. When the point is reached in a game where the focus shifts to the clock, a digital clock is perfectly able to express the required combination of agitation and impassivity, a flickering movement and an immoveable force, the 'little fidget wheels' of time and the 'flood that does not flow' (as Australian poet Kenneth Slessor puts it in his *Five Bells* ([1939] (2014): 1–2)). As an interruption of the sensory-motor schema, the affection-image brings time close to surface of the image and its reflective and intensive poles are like the affective dyad of time itself, the necessity and futility of struggle. Time always means both opportunity and fatality in sport: there is always next year when it is not your day on the day.

Deleuze argues that the function of the close-up is not to enlarge a small part of an object or scene, but to recreate the part as a thing apart, detaching it from its material relationship to the scene or object it is part of so it functions as a self-contained whole (Deleuze 1983: 136/95–6). The affection-image deterritorialises its object, abstracting it from its spatio-temporal coordinates and its place in a causal chain. In this way, affection-images recreate their own environment or atmosphere that Deleuze calls an 'any-space-whatever', which is the environmental correlate of the face: 'a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible' (155/109). A playing field is effectively the overlap of a face and an any-space-whatever. It cordons off a section of the world and remakes that section of the world into its own world with its own rules and relationships, surfaces and intensities. It is an arena for physical action, but it frames those actions as 'play', virtually removed from the functionality or consequentiality of actions in the 'real world'. Any actual, serious consequences of action on the field (or in the stands) are as shocking as when a theatre gun contains real bullets. When actuality intrudes and lives are threatened, the any-space-whatever is immediately sent back to the physical world governed by causality and logistics. It demonstrates, retrospectively, the power and insularity of the virtual world that was established by the game.

III. Conclusion

Cinema has often been often regarded as an aesthetic phenomenon with a special relationship to modernity, in both its positive and negative aspects. In its early days especially, cinema was regarded as a sort of lens or symptom through which the particular energy – or neurosis – of mass culture could be analysed. In terms of its aesthetic status, sport is perhaps still perceived in the same way as cinema was in its early days: as an industry of distraction and vehicle of capitalist values. This was certainly the view of C. L. R. James's Marxist colleagues, against whom he made a case for the positive artistic and political value of sports. It is easy to analyse modern sport as an exemplar of modern mass culture, media and commerce, but the aim here has been to focus on its aesthetic qualities as expressing a specifically modern sensibility, in a similar way to film. This relies on differentiating modern sports from earlier ones, drawing on Deleuze's distinction between antiquity and modernity in terms of their conception of movement. It also means identifying an aesthetic substance of sport so it can be talked about in formal terms rather than in reference to any psychological or ideological content. Deleuze's concepts of the movement- and affection-image allow the aesthetic power of sport to be explained on its own terms as a composition of time, space and movement, and make a place for sport in the taxonomy of images.

Notes

1. The first page reference in all in-text references to French works is for the French text, followed by the page reference for the English translation, as per the order in which the editions are listed in the bibliography. All italics in quotes are from the source document.
2. The concept of faciality here is distinct from the faciality of Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* (chapter 7, 'Year Zero: Faciality'). In both cases the face is conceived as an inorganic, inhuman 'abstract machine' independent of any actual face or subject – the white wall/black hole polarity in *A Thousand Plateaus* and the reflective surface/intensive series polarity in *Cinema 1*. Each concept stands by itself, however, as a response to a specific problem, and this is the approach of this article. An analysis of the relationship between the two usages, or of how the faciality of *A Thousand Plateaus* relates to cinema or sport, would be a different article.

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